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Abstract—We present a style-transfer based wrapper, called
Universal Material Generator (UMG), to improve the generaliza-
tion performance of any fingerprint spoof detector against spoofs
made from materials not seen during training. Specifically, we
transfer the style (texture) characteristics between fingerprint im-
ages of known materials with the goal of synthesizing fingerprint
images corresponding to unknown materials, that may occupy
the space between the known materials in the deep feature space.
Synthetic live fingerprint images are also added to the training
dataset to force the CNN to learn generative-noise invariant fea-
tures which discriminate between lives and spoofs. The proposed
approach is shown to improve the generalization performance
of a state-of-the-art spoof detector, namely Fingerprint Spoof
Buster, from TDR of 75.24% to 91.78% @ FDR = 0.2%. These
results are based on a large-scale dataset of 5,743 live and 4,912
spoof images fabricated using 12 different materials. Additionally,
the UMG wrapper is shown to improve the average cross-sensor
spoof detection performance from 67.60% to 80.63% when tested
on the LivDet 2017 dataset. Training the UMG wrapper requires
only 100 live fingerprint images from the target sensor, alleviating
the time and resources required to generate large-scale live and
spoof datasets for a new sensor. We also fabricate physical spoof
artifacts using a mixture of known spoof materials to explore the
role of cross-material style transfer in improving generalization
performance.
Index Terms—Fingerprint spoof detection, presentation attack
detection, liveness detection, generalization, style transfer, finger-
print spoof buster
I. INTRODUCTION
W ITH the proliferation of automated fingerprint recog-nition systems in many applications, including mo-
bile payments, international border security, and national ID,
fingerprint spoof attacks are of increasing concern [3], [4].
Fingerprint spoof attacks, one of the most common forms of
presentation attacks1, include the use of gummy fingers [6]
and 2D or 3D printed fingerprint targets [7], [8], [9], [10],
i.e. fabricated finger-like objects with an accurate imitation
of one’s fingerprint to steal their identity. Other forms of
presentation attacks include use of altered fingerprints [11],
[12], i.e. intentionally tampered or damaged real fingerprint
patterns to avoid identification, and cadaver fingers [13].
Fingerprint spoof attacks can be realized using a mul-
titude of fabrication processes ranging from basic molding
and casting to utilizing sophisticated 2D and 3D printing
techniques [6], [7], [9]. Readily available and inexpensive
materials such as gelatin, play doh, and wood glue, have been
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1The ISO standard IEC 30107-1:2016(E) [5] defines presentation attacks as
the “presentation to the biometric data capture subsystem with the goal of
interfering with the operation of the biometric system”.
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Fig. 1. 3D t-SNE visualization of feature embeddings learned by Fingerprint
Spoof Buster [2] of (a) live (dark green) and eleven known spoof materials
(red) (2D printed paper, 3D universal targets, conductive ink on paper, dragon skin,
gold fingers, latex body paint, monster liquid latex, play doh, silicone, transparency,
and wood glue) used in training, and unknown spoof, gelatin (yellow). A
large overlap between unknown spoof (gelatin) and live feature embeddings
indicate poor generalization performance of state of the art spoof detector. (b)
Synthetic live (bright green) and synthetic spoof (orange) images generated
by the proposed Universal Material Generator (UMG) wrapper improve the
separation between real live and real spoof. 3D t-SNE visualizations are
available at http://tarangchugh.me/posts/umg/index.html
utilized to fabricate high fidelity fingerprint spoofs which are
capable of bypassing a fingerprint recognition system. For
example, in March 2013, a Brazilian doctor was arrested for
using spoof fingers made of silicone to fool the biometric
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2Fig. 2. Illustration of physical spoof artifacts and the corresponding images. Spoofs are fabricated using twelve different readily available and inexpensive
spoof materials. The physical artifacts and their fingerprint images do not necessarily correspond to the same finger.
attendance system at a hospital in Sao Paulo2. In July 2016,
researchers at Michigan State University unlocked a fingerprint
secured-smartphone using a 2D printed fingerprint spoof to
help police with a homicide case3, using the technique pro-
posed in [7]. In March 2018, a gang in Rajasthan, India, was
arrested for spoofing the biometric attendance system, using
glue casted in wax molds, to provide proxies for a police
entrance exam4. As recent as April 2019, a Galaxy S10 owner
with a 3D printer and a photo of his own fingerprint was
able to spoof the ultrasonic in-display fingerprint sensor on his
smartphone5. Other similar successful spoof attacks have been
reported showing the vulnerabilities of fingerprint biometric
systems6,7. It is likely that a large number of these attacks are
never detected and hence not reported.
In response to this growing threat, a series of fingerprint
Liveness Detection (LivDet) competitions [14] have been held
since 2009 to benchmark various spoof detection solutions.
See [15] for results of the LivDet 2019. Another initiative is
the IARPA ODIN Program [4] with the goal of developing
robust spoof detection systems for fingerprints, face, and iris
2https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-21756709
3http://statenews.com/article/2016/08/how-msu-researchers-unlocked-a-
fingerprint-secure-smartphone-to-help-police-with-homicide-case
4https://www.medianama.com/2018/03/223-cloned-thumb-prints-used-to-
spoof-biometrics-and-allow-proxies-to-answer-online-rajasthan-police-exam/
5https://imgur.com/gallery/8aGqsSu
6http://fortune.com/2016/04/07/guy-unlocked-iphone-play-doh/
7https://srlabs.de/bites/spoofing-fingerprints/
biometric modalities.
Generally, fingerprint spoofs can be detected by either (i)
hardware-based, or (ii) software-based approaches [3], [13]. In
the case of hardware-based approaches, the fingerprint readers
are augmented with sensor(s) which detect characteristics of
vitality, such as blood flow, thermal output, heartbeat, skin
distortion, and odor [16], [17]. Additionally, special types
of fingerprint sensing technologies have been developed for
imaging the sub-dermal friction ridge surface based on multi-
spectral [18], short-wave infrared [19] and optical coherent
tomography (OCT) [20], [21]. An open-source fingerprint
reader, called RaspiReader, uses two cameras to provide
complementary streams (direct-view and FTIR) of images for
spoof detection [22]. Ultrasound-based in-display fingerprint
readers developed for smartphones by Qualcomm Inc. [23]
utilize acoustic response characteristics for spoof detection.
In contrast, software-based solutions extract salient fea-
tures from the captured fingerprint image (or a sequence of
frames) for separating live and spoof images. The software-
based approaches in the literature are typically based on (i)
anatomical features (e.g. pore locations and their distribu-
tion [30]), (ii) physiological features (e.g. perspiration [31]),
and (iii) texture-based features (e.g. Weber Local Binary
Descriptor (WLBD) [32], SIFT [28]. Most state-of-the-art
approaches are learning-based, where the features are learned
by training convolutional neural networks (CNN) [33], [34],
[35], [36], [19], [2].
3TABLE I
SUMMARY OF THE STUDIES PRIMARILY FOCUSED ON FINGERPRINT SPOOF GENERALIZATION.
Study Approach Database Performance
Rattani et al. [24] Weibull-calibrated SVM LivDet 2011 EER = 19.70%
Ding & Ross [25] Ensemble of multiple one-class SVMs LivDet 2011 EER = 17.60%
Chugh & Jain [2] MobileNet trained on minutiae-centered local
patches
LivDet 2011-2015 ACE = 1.48% (LivDet 2015), 2.93%
(LivDet 2011, 2013)
Chugh & Jain [26] Identify a representative set of spoof materials to
cover the deep feature space
MSU-FPAD v2.0, 12 spoof
materials
TDR = 75.24% @ FDR = 0.2%
Engelsma & Jain [27] Ensemble of generative adversarial networks
(GANs)
Custom database with live
and 12 spoof materials
TDR = 49.80% @ FDR = 0.2%
Gonzlez-Soler et al. [28] Feature encoding of dense-SIFT features LivDet 2011-2015 TDR = 7.03% @ FDR = 1% (LivDet
2015), ACE = 1.01% (LivDet 2011,
2013)
Tolosana et al. [29] Fusion of two CNN architectures trained on SWIR
images
Custom database with live
and 8 spoof materials
EER = 1.35%
Gajawada et al. [1]
(preliminary work)
Style transfer from spoof to live images to improve
generalization; requires few samples of target
material
LivDet 2015, CrossMatch
sensor
TDR = 78.04% @ FDR = 0.1%
Proposed Approach Style transfer between known spoof materials to
improve generalizability against completely
unknown materials
MSU-FPAD v2.0, 12 spoof
materials & LivDet 2017
TDR = 91.78% @ FDR = 0.2%
(MSU-FPAD v2.0); Avg. Accuracy =
95.88% (LivDet 2017)
ACE = Average Classification Error; EER = Equal Error Rate; TDR = True Detection Rate (spoofs); FDR = False Detection Rate (spoofs)
One of the major limitations of current spoof detection
methods is their poor generalization performance across “un-
known” spoof materials, that were not used during training
of the spoof detector. To generalize an algorithm’s effective-
ness across spoof fabrication materials, called cross-material
performance, spoof detection has been referred to as an open-
set problem8 [24]. Table I presents a summary of the studies
primarily focused on generalization. Engelsma and Jain [39],
[27] proposed using an ensemble of generative adversarial net-
works (GANs) on live fingerprint images with the hypotheses
that features learned by a discriminator to distinguish between
real live and synthesized live fingerprints can be used to
separate live fingerprints from spoof fingerprints as well. One
limitation of this approach is that the discriminator in the GAN
architecture may learn many features related to structural noise
added by the generative process. Such features are likely not
present in the spoofs fabricated with unknown materials.
It has been shown that the selection of spoof materials used
in training (known spoofs) directly impacts the performance
against unknown spoofs [24], [26]. In particular, Chugh and
Jain [26] analyzed the material characteristics (two optical and
two physical) of 12 different spoof materials to identify a
representative set of six materials that cover most of the spoof
feature space. Although, this approach can be used to identify
if including a new spoof material in training dataset would be
beneficial, it does not improve the generalization performance
against materials that are unknown during training. With the
increasing popularity of fingerprint authentication systems,
8Open-set problems address the possibility of new classes during testing,
that were not seen during training. Closed-set problems, on the other hand,
evaluate only those classes that the system was trained on.
hackers are constantly devising new fabrication techniques and
novel materials to attack them. It is prohibitively expensive
to include all spoof fabrication materials in training a spoof
detector.
Additionally, fingerprint images captured using different
fingerprint sensors, typically, have unique characteristics due
to different sensing technologies, sensor noise, and varying
resolution. As a result, fingerprint spoof detectors, especially
CNN-based, are known to suffer from poor generalization
performance in the cross-sensor scenario, where the spoof
detector is trained on images captured using one sensor and
tested on images from another. Improving cross-sensor spoof
detection performance is important in order to alleviate the
time and resources involved in collecting large-scale datasets
with the introduction of new sensors.
In this paper, we propose a style-transfer based method
to improve the cross-material and cross-sensor generalization
performance of fingerprint spoof detectors. In particular, for
the cross-material scenario, we hypothesize that the texture
(style) information from the known spoof fingerprint images
can be transferred from one spoof type to another type to
synthesize spoof images potentially similar to spoofs fab-
ricated from materials not seen in the training set. In the
cross-sensor scenario, we utilize a small set of live fingerprint
images (∼ 100) from the target sensor, say Green Bit, to
transfer its sensor-specific style characteristics to large-scale
live and spoof datasets available from a source sensor, say
Digital Persona. Our framework, called Universal Material
Generator (UMG), is used to augment CNN-based spoof
detectors, significantly improving their performance against
novel materials, while retaining their performance on known
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Fig. 3. Proposed approach for (a) synthesizing spoof and live fingerprint patches, and (b) design of the proposed Universal Material Generator (UMG)
wrapper. An AdaIN module is used for performing the style transfer in the encoded feature space. The same VGG-19 [37] encoder is used for computing
content loss and style loss. A discriminator similar to the one used in DC-GAN [38] is used for computing the adversarial loss. The synthesized patches can
be used to train any fingerprint spoof detector. Hence, our approach is referred to as a wrapper which can be used in conjunction with any spoof detector.
materials. See Figure 5 for examples of some of the style
transferred images.
Realistic image synthesis is a challenging problem. Early
non-parametric methods faced difficulty in generating images
with textures that are not known during training [40]. Machine
learning has been very effective in this regard, both in terms
of realism and generality. Gatys et al. [41] perform artistic
style transfer, combining the content of an image with the
style of any other by minimizing the feature reconstruction
loss and a style reconstruction loss which are based on
features extracted from a pre-trained CNN at the same time.
While this approach generates realistic looking images, it is
computationally expensive since each step of the optimiza-
tion requires a forward and backward pass through the pre-
trained network. Other studies [42], [43], [44] have explored
training a feed-forward network to approximate solutions to
this optimization problem. There are other methods based on
feature statistics to perform style transfer [45], [46]. Elgammal
et al. [47] applied GANs to generate artistic images. Isola
et al. [48] used conditional adversarial networks to learn the
loss for image-to-image translation. Xian et al. [49] learnt
to synthesize objects consistent with texture suggestions. The
proposed Universal Material Generator builds on [46] and is
capable of producing realistic fingerprint images containing
style (texture) information from images of two different spoof
materials. Existing style transfer methods condition the source
image with target material style. However, in the context of
fingerprint synthesis, this results in a loss in fingerprint ridge-
5valley information (i.e. content). In order to preserve both
style and content, we use adversarial supervision to ensure that
the synthesized images appear similar to the real fingerprint
images.
The main contributions of this study are enumerated below.
• A style-transfer based wrapper, called Universal Material
Generator (UMG), to improve the generalization perfor-
mance of any fingerprint spoof detector against spoofs
made from materials not seen during training. It attempts
to synthesize impressions with style (texture) character-
istics potentially similar to unknown spoof materials by
interpolating the styles from known spoof materials.
• Experiments on a database of 5, 743 live and 4, 912
spoof images of 12 different materials to demonstrate
that the proposed approach improves the cross-material
generalization performance of a state-of-the-art spoof
detector from TDR of 75.4% to TDR of 91.78% @ FDR
= 0.2%. Additionally, experimental results on LivDet
2017 datasets show that the proposed approach achieves
state-of-the-art performance.
• Improved the cross-sensor spoof detection performance
by synthesizing large-scale live and spoof datasets using
only 100 live images from a new target sensor. Our
approach is shown to improve the average cross-sensor
spoof detection performance from 67.60% to 80.63% on
LivDet 2017 dataset.
• Used 3D t-SNE visualization to interpret the performance
improvement against unknown spoof materials.
• Fabricated physical spoof artifacts using a mixture of
known spoof materials to show that the synthetically
generated images using fingerprint images of the same
set of spoof materials correspond to an unknown material
with similar style (texture) characteristics.
Our preliminary work [1] utilized a few impressions of a
known spoof material to generate more impressions of that
material. It improved the spoof detection performance against
“known” spoof materials for which only limited training data
is available. In comparison, the proposed approach interpolates
the style characteristics of known spoof materials to improve
the spoof detection performance against “unknown” spoof
materials. The proposed approach is also shown to improve
the cross-sensor generalization performance.
II. PROPOSED APPROACH
The proposed approach includes three stages: (i) training
the Universal Material Generator (UMG) wrapper using the
spoof images of known materials (with one material left-
out from training), (ii) generating synthetic spoof images
using randomly selected image pairs of different but known
materials, and (iii) training a spoof detector on the augmented
dataset to evaluate its performance on the “unknown” material
left out from training. In all our experiments, we utilize
local image patches (96 × 96) centered and aligned using
minutiae location and orientation, respectively [2]. During the
evaluation stage, the spoof detection decision is made based on
the average of spoofness scores for individual patches output
from the CNN model. An overview of the proposed approach
is presented in Fig. 3.
A. Universal Material Generator (UMG) Wrapper
The primary goal of the UMG wrapper is to generate
synthetic spoof images corresponding to unknown spoof mate-
rials, by transferring the style (texture) characteristics between
fingerprint images of known spoof materials. Gatys et al. [50]
were the first to show that deep neural networks (DNNs)
could encode not only content but also the style information.
They proposed an optimization-based style-transfer approach,
although prohibitively slow, for arbitrary images. In [45],
Ulyanov et al. proposed use of an InstanceNorm layer to
normalize feature statistics across spatial dimensions. An
InstanceNorm layer is designed to perform the following
operation:
IN(x) = γ
(x− µ(x)
σ(x)
)
+ β (1)
where, x is the input feature space, µ(x) and σ(x) are
the mean and standard deviation parameters, respectively,
computed across spatial dimensions independently for each
channel and each sample. It was observed that changing the
affine parameters γ and β (while keeping convolutional param-
eters fixed) leads to variations in the style of the image, and
the affine parameters could be learned for each particular style.
This motivated an approach for artistic style transfer [51],
which learns γ and β values for each feature space and style
pair. However, this required retraining of the network for each
new style.
Huang and Belongie [46] replaced the InstanceNorm layer
with an Adaptive Instance Norm (AdaIN) layer, which can
directly compute affine parameters from the style image,
instead of learning them – effectively transferring style by
imparting second-order statistics from the target style image
to the source content image, through the affine parameters.
We follow the same approach as described in [46] in UMG
wrapper for fusing feature statistics of one known (source)
spoof material image (c) providing friction ridge (content)
information and source style, with another known, but different
(target style) spoof material (s) in the feature space. As
described in AdaIN, we apply instance normalization on the
input source image feature space however not with learnable
affine parameters. The channel-wise mean and variance of the
source image’s feature space is aligned to match those of the
target image’s feature space. This is done by computing the
affine parameters from the target material spoof feature space
in the following manner:
AdaIN(x, y) = σ(y)
(x− µ(x)
σ(x)
)
+ µ(y) (2)
where the source (c) feature space is x and the target
(s) feature space is y. In this manner, x is normalized with
σ(y) and shifted by µ(y). Our synthetic spoof generator G
is composed of an encoder f(·) and a decoder g(·). For the
encoder, f(·), we use the first few layers of a pre-trained VGG-
19 network similar to [42]. The weights of this network are
frozen throughout all stages of the setup. For source image (c)
and the target image (s), x is f(c) and y is f(s). The desired
feature space is obtained as:
t = AdaIN(f(c), f(s)) (3)
6Style A α =	0.2 α =	0.4 α =	0.6 α =	0.8 α =	1.0Real Spoof Synthetic Spoofs
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Fig. 4. Style transfer between real spoof patches fabricated with latex body paint and silicone to generate synthetic spoof patches using the proposed Universal
Material Generator (UMG) wrapper. The extent of style transfer can be controlled by the parameter α ∈ [0, 1].
We use the decoder, g(·), to take t as input to produce
T (c, s) = g(t) which is the final synthesized image condi-
tioned on the style from the target image. In order to ensure
that our synthesized spoof patches i.e g(t) do match the style
statistics of the target material spoof, we apply a style loss Ls
similar to [42], [52] given as:
Ls =
∑L
i=1 ‖µ (φi(g(t)))− µ (φi(s))‖2+∑L
i=1 ‖σ (φi(g(t)))− σ (φi(s))‖2
(4)
where each φi denotes a layer in the VGG-19 network we
use as encoder. We pass g(t) and s through f(·) and extract
the outputs of relu1 1, relu2 1, relu3 1 and relu4 1 layers
for computing Ls.
The extent of style transfer can be controlled by interpolat-
ing between feature maps that are:
T (c, s, α) = g((1− α) · f(c) + α · t) (5)
where setting α = 0 will reconstruct the original content
image and α = 1 will construct the most stylized image. To
combine the two known styles, we preserve the style of source
spoof material while conditioning it with target spoof material
by setting the value of α to 0.5.
To ensure that the synthesized images retain friction ridge
(fingerprint) content from the real image, we use a content loss,
Lc, which is computed as the euclidean distance between the
features of the synthesized image i.e. f(g(t)) and the target
features (t) from the real image.
Lc = ‖f(g(t))− t‖2 (6)
Doing the style transfer, simply using a content loss (Lc)
to ensure that content is retained is not enough to ensure that
the synthesized images look like real images. Fingerprints
have many details in terms of structure due to the presence
of certain landmarks e.g. minutiae, ridges, and pores. With
the aim of synthesizing fingerprints that look indistinguishable
from the real fingerprints, we use adversarial supervision. A
typical generative adversarial network (GAN) setup consists
Algorithm 1 Training UMG wrapper
1: procedure
2: input
3: x: source image providing friction ridge content and
known style A
4: y: target image providing known style B
5: f(·): encoder network; first 4 layers of VGG-19 net-
work pre-trained on ImageNet with weights frozen during
training
6: g(·): decoder network; mirrors f(·) with pooling layers
replaced with nearest up-sampling layers
7: D(·): discriminator function similar to [38]
8: A(x, y): AdaIN operation; transfer style from x to y
(using Eq. 2)
9: α = 0.5
10: λc = 0.001, λs = 0.002
11: output
12: UMG(·): UMG wrapper trained on known materials
13: begin:
14: Encoding: fx = f(x) and fy = f(y)
15: Style transfer: t = A(fx, fy)
16: Stylized image: T (c, s, α) = g((1− α) · fc + α · t)
17: Style Loss: Ls using Eq. 4
18: Content Loss: Lc using Eq. 6
19: Adversarial Loss (generator): LGadv using Eq. 7
20: Adversarial Loss (discriminator): LDadv using Eq. 8
21: Objective functions for training UMG wrapper
22: minG LG = λc · Lc + λs · Ls + LGadv
23: maxD LD = LDadv
24: end
of a generator G and a discriminator D playing a minimax
game, where D tries to distinguish between synthesized and
real images, and G tries to fool D by generating realistic
looking images. The adversarial objective functions for the
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Fig. 5. Synthesized spoof patches (96 x 96) by the proposed Universal Material Generator using patches of a known (source) material (first column) conditioned
on style (α = 0.5) of another (target) known material (first row).
generator (LGadv) and discriminator (LDadv) are given as9:
LGadv = Et[log(1−D(G(t)))] (7)
LDadv = Ex[logD(x)] + Et[log(1−D(G(t)))] (8)
In our approach, we use a discriminator as used in [38] and
the generator is the decoder function g(·). We optimize the
9Here x is an image sampled from the distribution of real fingerprints, and t
is the feature output by the AdaIN module.
UMG wrapper in an end-to-end manner with the following
objective functions:
min
G
LG = λc · Lc + λs · Ls + LGadv (9)
max
D
LD = LDadv (10)
where λc and λs are the weight parameters for content loss
(Lc) and style loss (Ls), respectively. Algorithm 1 summarizes
the steps involved in training a UMG wrapper.
8TABLE II
SUMMARY OF THE MSU-FPAD V2 AND LIVDET 2017 DATASETS.
Dataset MSU-FPAD v2 [26] LivDet 2017 [53]
Fingerprint Reader CrossMatch Guardian 200
GreenBit Orcanthus Digital Persona
Dacty Scan 84C Certis2 Image U.are.U 5160
Image Size (px.) (w × h) 800× 750 500× 500 300× n† 252× 324
Resolution (dpi) 500 569 500 500
#Live Images (Train / Test) 4, 743 / 1, 000 1, 000 / 1, 700 1, 000 / 1, 700 999 / 1, 692
#Spoof Images (Train / Test) 4, 912 (leave-one-out) 1, 200 / 2, 040 1, 180∗ / 2, 018 1, 199 / 2, 028
Known Spoof Materials
(Training)
Leave-one-out: 2D Printed Paper, 3D Universal Targets,
Conductive Ink on Paper, Dragon Skin, Gelatin,
Gold Fingers, Latex Body Paint, Monster Liquid Latex,
Play Doh, Silicone, Transparency, Wood Glue
Wood Glue, Ecoflex, Body Double
Unknown Spoof Materials
(Testing)
Gelatine, Latex, Liquid Ecoflex
† Fingerprint images captured using Orcanthus reader have a variable height (350− 450px) depending on the friction ridge content.
*A set of 20 Latex spoof fingerprints found in the training set of Orcanthus fingerprint reader were excluded in our experiments. Only Wood Glue, Ecoflex,
and Body Double are expected to be in the training dataset.
(a) Source Style
(Real)
(c) Target Style
(Real)
(b) Output
(Synthetic)
Fig. 6. Synthetic live images generated by the proposed Universal Material
Generator. (a) Source style images, (c) target style images, and (b) synthesized
live images.
B. UMG-Wrapper for Spoof Generalization
Given a spoof dataset of real images, Smreal, fabricated using
a set of m spoof materials, we adopt a leave-one-out protocol
to split the dataset such that spoof images fabricated using
m − 1 materials are considered as “known” and used for
training. And the images fabricated using the left-out mth
material are considered as “unknown” and used for computing
the generalization performance. The fingerprint images of
known materials (k = m − 1) are used to train the UMG
wrapper (UMGspoof ) described in section II-A.
After we train the UMGspoof , we utilize a total of Nsynth
randomly selected pairs of images {Iima , Iimb} s.t. i ∈{1, ..., Nsynth} from known but different materials ma,mb ∈
{m1, ...mk}, a 6= b, to generate a dataset of synthesized
spoof images Sksynth. For each synthesized image, the friction
ridge (content) information and the source material (style)
characteristics are provided by the first image, Ima , and
the target material (style) characteristics are provided by the
second image, Imb . See Figures 4 and 5. The real spoof
dataset is augmented with the synthesized spoof data to
create a dataset that is used for training the fingerprint spoof
detector. Additionally, we also augment the real live dataset
with a total of Nsynth synthesized live images using another
UMG wrapper (UMGlive) trained on only live images. Adding
synthesized live data balances the data distribution and forces
the spoof detector to learn generative-noise invariant features
to distinguish between lives and spoofs. Figure 6 presents
examples of the synthesized live images.
C. Fingerprint Spoof Detection
The proposed Universal Material Generator approach acts
like a wrapper on top of any existing spoof detector to
make it more robust to spoofs not seen during training. In
this study, we employ Fingerprint Spoof Buster [2], a state-
of-the-art CNN-based approach, that utilizes local patches
(96× 96) centered and aligned around fingerprint minutiae to
train MobileNet-v1 [54] architecture. It achieved state-of-the-
art performance on publicly available LivDet databases [14]
and exceeded the IARPA Odin Project [4] requirement of
True Detection Rate (TDR) of 97.0% @ False Detection Rate
(FDR) = 0.2%.
III. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
A. Datasets
The following datasets have been utilized in this study:
1) MSU Fingerprint Presentation Attack Database (FPAD)
v2.0: A database of 5, 743 live and 4, 912 spoof images
captured on CrossMatch Guardian 20010, one of the most
popular slap readers. The database is constructed by combining
the publicly available [2] MSU Fingerprint Presentation Attack
Dataset v1.0 (MSU-FPAD v1.0) and Precise Biometrics Spoof-
Kit Dataset (PBSKD). Tables II and III presents the details of
10https://www.crossmatch.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/20160726-DS-
En-Guardian-200.pdf
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GENERALIZATION PERFORMANCE (TDR (%) @ FDR = 0.2%) WITH LEAVE-ONE-OUT METHOD ON MSU-FPAD V2 DATASET. A TOTAL OF TWELVE
MODELS ARE TRAINED WHERE THE MATERIAL LEFT-OUT FROM TRAINING IS TAKEN AS THE “UNKNOWN” MATERIAL FOR EVALUATING THE MODEL.
Unknown Spoof Material # Images # Local Patches
Generalization Performance (TDR (%) @ FDR = 0.2%)
Fingerprint Spoof Buster [26] Fingerprint Spoof Buster +
UMG wrapper
Silicone 1, 160 38, 145 67.62 98.64
Monster Liquid Latex 882 27, 458 94.77 96.24
Play Doh 715 17, 602 58.42 72.36
2D Printed Paper 481 7, 381 55.44 80.22
Wood Glue 397 12, 681 86.38 98.97
Gold Fingers 295 9, 402 88.22 88.59
Gelatin 294 10, 508 54.95 97.96
Dragon Skin 285 7, 700 97.48 100.00
Latex Body Paint 176 6, 366 76.35 89.72
Transparency 137 3, 846 95.83 100.00
Conductive Ink on Paper 50 2, 205 90.00 100.00
3D Universal Targets 40 1, 085 95.00 100.00
Total Spoofs 4,912 144,379 Weighted mean* (± weighted s.d.)
Total Lives 5,743 228,143 75.24 ± 15.21 91.78 ± 9.43
*The generalization performance for each spoof material is weighted by the number of images to produce the weighted mean and standard deviation.
TABLE IV
PERFORMANCE COMPARISON BETWEEN THE PROPOSED APPROACH AND STATE-OF-THE-ART RESULTS [53] REPORTED ON LIVDET 2017 DATASET FOR
CROSS-MATERIAL EXPERIMENTS IN TERMS OF AVERAGE CLASSIFICATION ERROR (ACE) AND TDR @ FDR = 1.0%.
LivDet 2017 LivDet 2017 Winner [53] Fingerprint Spoof Buster [26] Fingerprint Spoof Buster + UMG wrapper
ACE (%) ACE (%) TDR @ FDR = 1.0% ACE (%) TDR @ FDR = 1.0%
Green Bit 96.44 96.68 91.07 97.42 92.29
Orcanthus 95.59 94.51 66.59 95.01 74.45
Digital Persona 93.71 95.12 62.29 95.20 75.47
Mean ± s.d. 95.25 ± 1.40 95.44 ± 1.12 73.32 ± 15.52 95.88 ± 1.34 80.74 ± 10.02
this database including the sensors used, 12 spoof materials,
total number of fingerprint impressions, and the number of
minutiae-based local patches for each material type. Fig. 2
presents sample fingerprint spoof images fabricated using the
12 materials.
2) LivDet Datasets: LivDet 2017 [53] dataset is one of the
most recent11 publicly-available LivDet datasets, containing
over 17, 500 fingerprint images. These images are acquired
using three different fingerprint readers, namely Green Bit,
Orcanthus, and Digital Persona. Unlike other LivDet datasets,
spoof fingerprint images included in the test set are fabricated
using new materials (Wood Glue, Ecoflex, and Body Double),
11The testing set of LivDet 2019 database has not yet been made public.
that are not used in the training set (Wood Glue, Ecoflex, and
Body Double). Table II presents a summary of the LivDet
2017 dataset.
B. Minutiae Detection and Patch Extraction
The proposed UMG wrapper is trained on local patches
of size 96 × 96 centered and aligned using minutiae points.
We extract fingerprint minutiae using the algorithm proposed
in [55]. For a given fingerprint image I with k detected minu-
tiae points, M = {m1,m2, . . . ,mk}, where mi = {xi, yi, θi},
i.e. the minutiae mi is defined in terms of spatial coordinates
(xi, yi) and orientation (θi), a corresponding set of k local
patches L = {l1, l2, . . . , lk}, each of size [96 × 96], centered
10
TABLE V
CROSS-SENSOR FINGERPRINT SPOOF GENERALIZATION PERFORMANCE ON LIVDET 2017 DATASET IN TERMS OF AVERAGE CLASSIFICATION ERROR
(ACE) AND TDR @ FDR = 1.0%.
LivDet 2017 Fingerprint Spoof Buster [26] Fingerprint Spoof Buster + UMG wrapper
Sensor in Training Sensor in Testing ACE (%) TDR @ FDR = 1.0% ACE (%) TDR @ FDR = 1.0%
Green Bit Orcanthus 49.43 0.00 66.05 21.52
Green Bit Digital Persona 89.37 57.48 94.81 72.91
Orcanthus GreenBit 69.93 8.00 81.75 30.91
Orcanthus Digital Persona 57.99 4.97 76.36 28.46
Digital Persona GreenBit 89.54 57.06 96.35 85.21
Digital Persona Orcanthus 49.32 0.00 68.44 20.38
Mean ± s.d. 67.60± 18.53 21.25± 28.07 80.63± 12.88 43.23± 28.31
and aligned using minutiae location (xi, yi) and orientation
(θi), are extracted as proposed in [2].
C. Implementation Details
The encoder of the UMG wrapper is the first four convo-
lutional layers (conv1 1, conv2 1, conv3 1, and conv4 1)
of a VGG-19 network [37] as discussed in section II-A. We
use weights pre-trained on ImageNet [56] database which are
frozen during training of the UMG wrapper. The decoder
mirrors the encoder with pooling layers replaced with nearest
up-sampling layers, and without use of any normalization
layers as suggested in [46]. Both encoder and decoder utilize
reflection padding to avoid border artifacts. The discriminator
for computing the adversarial loss is similar to the one used
in [38]. The weights for style loss and content loss are set to
λs = 0.002 and λc = 0.001. We use the Adam optimizer [57]
with a batch size of 8 and a learning rate of (1e− 4) for both
generator (decoder) and discriminator objective functions. The
input local patches are resized from 96 × 96 to 256 × 256
as required by the pre-trained encoder based on VGG-19
network. All experiments are performed in the TensorFlow
framework.
For the spoof detector, we train a MobileNet-V1 [54]
classifier from scratch similar to [2] using the augmented
dataset. The last layer of the architecture, a 1000-unit softmax
layer (originally designed to predict the 1, 000 classes of
ImageNet dataset), was replaced with a 2-unit softmax layer
for the two-class problem, i.e. live vs. spoof. The optimizer
used to train the network is RMSProp with asynchronous
gradient descent and a batch size of 100.
D. Experimental Protocol
The fingerprint spoof generalization performance against
unknown materials is evaluated by adopting a leave-one-out
protocol [26]. In the case of MSU FPAD v2.0 dataset, one
out of the twelve known spoof materials is left-out and the re-
maining eleven materials are used to train the proposed UMG
wrapper. The real spoof data (of eleven known materials) is
augmented with the synthesized spoof data generated using
the trained UMG wrapper, which is then used to train the fin-
gerprint spoof detector i.e. Fingerprint Spoof Buster [2]. This
requires training a total of twelve different UMG wrappers
and spoof detection models each time leaving out one of the
twelve different spoof materials. The 5, 743 live images in
MSUFPAD v2.0 are partitioned into training and testing such
that there are 1, 000 randomly selected live images in testing
set and the remaining 4, 743 images in training such that there
is no subject overlap between training and testing data splits.
The real live data is also augmented with synthesized live
data generated using another UMG wrapper trained on real
live data.
In the case of LivDet 2017 dataset, the spoof materials
available in the test set (Gelatin, Latex, and Liquid Ecoflex)
are deemed as “unknown” materials because these are different
from the materials included in the training set (Wood Glue,
Ecoflex, and Body Double). To evaluate the generalization
performance, we evaluate the performance of Fingerprint
Spoof Buster with and without using the UMG wrapper and
compare with the state-of-the-art published results. As the
LivDet 2017 dataset contains fingerprint images from three
different readers, we train two UMG wrappers per sensor, one
for each of the live and the spoof training datasets.
E. Cross-Material Fingerprint Spoof Generalization
Table III presents the generalization performance of the
proposed approach on the MSU FPAD v2.0 dataset. The
mean generalization performance of the spoof detector against
unknown spoof materials improves from TDR of 75.24%
to TDR of 91.78% @ FDR = 0.2%, resulting in a 67%
decrease in the error rate, when the spoof detector is trained
in conjunction with the proposed UMG wrapper. Table IV
presents a performance comparison of the proposed approach
and the state-of-the-art approach when tested on the publicly
available LivDet 2017 dataset. The proposed UMG wrapper
improves the state-of-the-art [2] average cross-material spoof
detection performance from 95.44% to 95.88%. However, a
much higher performance gain is observed, from TDR of
73.32% to 80.74%, at a strict operating point of FDR = 1%.
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Green Bit OrcanthusDigital Persona
Fig. 7. Example fingerprint images from LivDet 2017 database captured using
three different fingerprint readers, namely Digital Persona, Green Bit, and
Orcanthus. The unique characteristics of fingerprints from Orcanthus reader
explain the performance drop in cross-sensor scenario when Orcanthus is used
as either the source or the target sensor.
(a) Real Live Patch
Digital Persona
(b) Real Live Patch
Orcanthus
(c) Synthesized Live Patch
UMG Wrapper
Fig. 8. UMG wrapper used to transfer style from (b) a real live patch from
Orcanthus reader, to (a) a real live patch from Digital Persona, to generate
(c) a synthesized patch.
F. Cross-Sensor Fingerprint Spoof Generalization
To improve the cross-sensor performance, we employ the
proposed UMG wrapper to synthetically generate large-scale
live and spoof datasets to train a spoof detector for the target
sensor. Given a real fingerprint database, DAreal, collected on a
source fingerprint sensor, FA, containing real live, LAreal, and
real spoof SAreal datasets, s.t. D
A
real = {LAreal ∪ SAreal}, the
proposed UMG wrapper is used to generate 50, 000 synthetic
live patches, LBsynth, and 50, 000 synthetic spoof patches,
SBsynth, for a target sensor, FB . The UMG wrapper is trained
only on the live images collected on SB , and used for style
transfer on LAreal and S
A
real to generate L
B
synth, and S
B
synth,
respectively. We evaluate the cross-sensor generalization per-
formance using LivDet 2017 dataset where the UMG wrapper
trained on source sensor, say Green Bit, is used to generate
synthetic data for a target sensor, say Orcanthus, using only
a small set of 100 live fingerprint images from the target
sensor12. The spoof detector is trained from scratch only on
the synthetic dataset created for the target sensor using UMG
wrapper and tested on the real test set of the target sensor.
Table V presents the cross-sensor fingerprint spoof general-
ization performance of the spoof detector in terms of average
classification accuracy and TDR (%) @ FDR = 1%. We note
that the proposed UMG wrapper improves the average cross-
sensor spoof detection performance from 67.60% to 80.63%.
12An average of ∼ 3100 local patches are extracted from 100 live fingerprint
images in LivDet 2017 experiments.
(a) Real spoof A
(Silicone)
(d) Synthesized Spoof
(spoof A + spoof B)
(b) Real spoof B
(Latex Body Paint)
(c) Real spoof mixture
(spoof A + spoof B)
Fig. 9. Fingerprint patches fabricated with real spoofs (a) silicone, (b) latex
body paint, (c) their mixture (in 1:1 ratio), and (d) synthesized using UMG
wrapper with style transfer between silicone and latex body paint.
Figure 7 presents example fingerprint images captured using
the three sensors in LivDet 2017. The unique characteristics
of fingerprints from Orcanthus reader explain the performance
drop in cross-sensor scenario when it is used as either the
source or the target sensor.
G. Computational Requirements
The proposed approach includes an offline stage of training
the UMG wrapper and synthesis of fingerprints for augmenting
the training dataset. Therefore, once the spoof detector is
trained on the augmented data, the proposed approach has no
impact on the computational requirements in the online spoof
detection test stage. The proposed UMG wrapper takes under
2 hours to train, and around 1 hour to generate 100,000 local
fingerprint patches on a Nvidia GTX 1080Ti GPU.
IV. FABRICATING UNKNOWN SPOOFS
To explore the role of cross-material style transfer in
improving generalization performance, we fabricate physical
spoof specimens using two spoof materials, namely silicone
and latex body paint, and their mixture in a 1:1 ratio by
volume13. We fabricate a total of 24 physical specimens,
including 8 specimens for each of the two materials, and 8
13Not all spoof materials can be physically combined and may result in
mixtures with poor physical properties for them to be used to fabricate
any good quality spoof artifacts.
12
Real Live
Latex Body Paint (real spoof)
Silicone (real spoof)
Real Spoof Mixture (silicone + latex body paint)
Synthetically Generated Spoof 
(style transfer b/w silicone and latex body paint)
Fig. 10. 3D t-SNE visualization of feature embeddings of real live finger-
prints, spoof fingerprints fabricated using silicone, latex body paint, and their
mixture (1:1 ratio), and synthesized spoof fingerprints using style-transfer
between silicone and latex body paint spoof fingerprints. The 3D embeddings
are available at http://tarangchugh.me/posts/umg/index.html
specimens using their mixture. A total of 72 spoof fingerprints,
3 impressions/specimen, are captured using a CrossMatch
Guardian 200 fingerprint reader. Fingerprint Spoof Buster,
trained on twelve known spoof materials including silicone
and latex body paint, achieves TDR of 100% @ FDR = 0.2%
on the two known spoof materials, and TDR of 83.33 @ FDR
= 0.2% against the mixture. We utilize the testing dataset of
1, 000 live fingerprint images from MSU FPAD v2.0 for these
experiments.
We utilize the proposed UMG wrapper to generate a dataset
of 5, 000 synthesized spoof patches14 using cross-material
style transfer between spoof fingerprints of silicone and latex
body paint. Fingerprint Spoof Buster, fine-tuned using the syn-
thesized dataset, improves the TDR from 83.33% to 95.83%
@ FDR = 0.2% when tested on the silicone and latex body
paint mixture, highlighting the role of the style-transferred
synthesized data in improving generalization performance.
Figure 9 presents sample fingerprint patches of the two spoof
materials, silicone and latex body paint, their physical mixture,
and synthesized using style-transfer. Figure 10 presents the 3D
t-SNE visualization of feature embeddings of live fingerprints
(green), two materials, silicone (blue) and latex body paint
(brown), their mixture (purple), and synthetically generated
images (orange). Although the mixture embeddings are not
14Around 1,100 minutiae-based local patches are extracted from 24 fingerprint
images corresponding to each material.
exactly in between the embeddings for the two known ma-
terials, possibly due to low-dimensional t-SNE representation,
they are close to the embeddings of the synthetically generated
spoof images. This explains the improvement in performance
against mixture when synthesized spoofs are used in training.
Therefore, the proposed UMG wrapper is able to generate
spoof images that are potentially similar to the unknown
spoofs.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Automatic fingerprint spoof detection is critical for secure
operation of a fingerprint recognition system. Introduction of
new spoof materials and fabrication techniques poses a con-
tinuous threat and requires design of robust and generalizable
spoof detectors. To address that, we propose a style-transfer
based wrapper, Universal Material Generator (UMG), to im-
prove the generalization performance of any spoof detector
against novel spoof fabrication materials that are unknown to
the system during training. The proposed approach is shown
to improve the average generalization performance of a state-
of-the-art spoof detector from TDR of 75.24% to 91.78%
@ FDR = 0.2% when evaluated on a large-scale dataset
of 5,743 live and 4,912 spoof images fabricated using 12
materials. It is also shown to improve the average cross-sensor
performance from 67.60% to 80.63% when tested on LivDet
2017 dataset, alleviating the time and resources required to
generate large-scale spoof datasets for every new sensor. We
have also fabricated physical spoof specimens using a mixture
of known spoof materials to explore the role of cross-material
style-transfer in improving generalization performance.
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